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Relationship between top executive compensation 
and corporate governance: evidence from large 
Italian listed companies 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The modernization of corporate governance aims the alignment of the interests of managers with those 
of companies, promoting a new discipline of internal controls and risk analysis with an enforcement 
of shareholder rights of information. This research investigates the impact of corporate governance 
variables –ownership, board of directors and remuneration committee– on executive compensation. 
A balanced sample of 52 Italian listed companies has been adopted to test the hypotheses, covering 
55.98% and 47.13% of market capitalization in 2011 and 2015 respectively and including 669 board 
members. Theoretical models evidence a certain stability of compensation schemes for Italian 
managers over time. Findings suggest that there is a statistically significant positive effect of familiar 
ownership on the amount of compensation. Along with nature of ownership, the number of directors 
in the remuneration committee appointed by minorities assume a determinant role. With statistical 
significance, it affects negatively the compensation level, but, contrarily to best practices, it affects 
negatively the adoption of forms of incentive compensation. 
 
Keywords: executive compensation; corporate governance; remuneration committee; family firms; 
Italy 
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1. Introduction and objectives 
The huge number of studies about the level and the structure of top management remuneration testifies 
the interest of this topic among academics, corporate governance experts, politicians, media and public 
opinion. The relationship between board and executive compensation has been over time one of the 
most discussed topics in the literature about corporate governance. In recent years, and in particular 
after the financial crisis of 2008, this topic has been object of particular attention: increase in the 
amount of executive pay, mixed by a debatable relation between these payments and firm 
performance of short and medium-long term, drove the analysis of the phenomenon not only by 
American scholars, but also by researchers of many other countries. Main inquisitiveness is related to 
the will to understand the determinants of remuneration systems developed and employed by large 
firms to remunerate their top executives. Inside this broad research, a growing attention has been 
committed to the influence exercised by variables of corporate governance on remuneration policies. 
The vast majority of studies related to executive compensation and equity-based remuneration is 
centred primarily in US, and only to a smaller extent in UK. In these countries, disclosure of top 
executive compensation has been mandated by law before than in other countries. Little evidence is 
provided for companies in Continental Europe, although these represent a peculiar case, with high 
ownership concentration and a large adoption of control-enhancing devices (Barontini and Bozzi, 
2011). These features assume particular interest in their expected effect on the structure and amount 
of executive compensation. This research can be inserted in the stand of literature that studies the 
corporate governance mechanisms in non-Anglo-Saxon countries.   Focus of this work is indeed 
related to Italian listed companies. They represent a peculiar sample due to their similarities in terms 
of ownership characteristics, corporate governance issues and agency problems, with respect to much 
of listed firms in Continental Europe countries. The peculiar environment in terms of corporate 
governance system is characterized by “weak managers, strong block holders and unprotected 
minority shareholders” (Melis, 2000: 354). Zattoni (1999) emphasizes the peculiar distribution of 
 4 
shareholding: the ownership structure is highly concentrated and, in much of cases, the main 
shareholder is represented by a family or by a public entity.  Banks and other financial institutions 
assume rarely the role of large shareholders, without exerting a significant influence on companies 
(Bianchi et al., 2010). Additionally, Italian stock market is still small and undeveloped if compared to 
other countries, with a market for corporate control that is almost absent (Bianco, 2001). In past 
decade, Italian companies have been interested by the large wave of recommendations promoted by 
the European Commission. The modernization of corporate law was promoted with the aim to align 
the interests of managers with those of companies, with a new discipline of internal control and with 
an enforcement of shareholder rights of information. Main outcomes of the regulations have been the 
mandatory disclosure of remuneration policies through remuneration reports and the introduction of 
a remuneration committee inside the board of directors, appointed with the responsibility to monitor 
and support the board in the definition of executive compensation plans.  This normative evolution 
paves the way for the analysis of new corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of executive 
compensation schemes, offering the author the possibility to provide new evidences to the current 
literature. In detail, the research is moved by the intention to discover the impact of remuneration 
committee features on the definition of executive compensation, attempting to provide insights about 
a possible evolution of the remuneration policies over time following the Self-Discipline Code criteria 
of equilibrium between fixed and variable compensation. Along with remuneration committee 
variables, composition of the board of directors, ownership structure and nature will be studied as 
determinant of executive compensation.  The work will be structured as follow: the first part will 
provide an overview of the existing literature, inserting the compensation of executives in the wider 
panel of agency problems and indicating the possible governance mechanisms influencing 
remuneration schemes. Research questions will be drawn in this section. The second part will convey 
the empirical research, with a specification of sample and data collection method, preliminary tests 
performed and a description of variables adopted. Descriptive and empirical results will be finally 
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provided. Last section will provide conclusions, with a list of study limitations and suggestions for 
further research.  
2. Literature review and development of hypotheses 
Executive remuneration can be explained by two divergent theories. According to optimal contracting 
theory (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), the board of directors operates independently by management, 
setting the level and the composition of executive compensation. In line with this view, remuneration 
packages are designed to minimize agency problems and maximize shareholders value. Relevance is 
attributable to variable compensation that anchors the level of compensation to performance results 
and share value. Although this positive aspect, Jensen et al. (2004: 50), noted that “while remuneration 
can be a solution to agency problems, it can also be a source of agency problems”. Bebchuck et al. 
(2002) provide evidence of the fact that executives, due to their position of power within firms, are 
able to achieve excessive remuneration in the form of rents. The design of executive compensation 
structure seems consequently not related to an optimal contracting, but rather to rent-extracting 
reasons. Both the optimal contracting and rent extraction theories directly recall the main theoretical 
perspective adopted to in the scholarly research about director remuneration. This is the economic one, 
that relies on agency theory. The analysis of agency problems theory assumes peculiar relevance in 
the context of block holder-dominated firms, with a specific reference to family firms, that represent 
a significant panel inside the broader set of Italian listed companies. Bech et al. (2003: 3) define 
corporate governance as “the reconciliation of conflict of interest between various corporate 
claimholders”. The first and more studied agency problem is that described by Fama and Jensen 
(1983): the separation of ownership and control implies a direct conflict of interest between principal 
(owner) and agent (managers). In public listed firms, characterised by the absence of large block 
holders, shareholders delegate managers to act in their behalf. When decision making is delegated to 
managers, shareholders’ ability to monitor their behaviours is reduced (Shleifer and Visnhy, 1997), 
implying an increase of the risks that management abuses of its power. When ownership is highly 
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concentrated, there is a greater possibility that owners (generally single person or small groups) are 
more incentivised to monitor executives so that they do not deviate by their objectives. In this context, 
ownership concentration works as a mechanism to mitigate Agency Problem I and family ownership 
is a peculiar case within it.  Since their own wealth is at stake, family shareholders are more dedicated 
and effective monitors with respect to other kinds of shareholders. In contrast, different sorts of 
controlling shareholders, such as public entities, banks or other institutions, appear less prone to 
monitor managers, since they assume the form of agent for their respective super-principals. A wide 
set of corporate governance mechanisms is adopted in corporations to mitigate agency problems 
(OECD, 2015) and executive compensation is one of the most relevant: as emphasized by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), well-designed contracts offer ex-ante an alignment of managers’ and owners’ 
interests. Between agency costs for the firm, a larger panel of mechanisms is supposed to affect the 
remuneration of board of directors and of executives: ownership concentration, board of directors and 
its subcommittee. As pointed out by Dyl (1998), in companies with a greater ownership concentration, 
majority shareholder is in the position to be both incentivised and endowed of decisional power to 
influence managerial choices, among which executive remuneration. According to Barontini and 
Bozzi (2011), a more concentrated ownership, increasing the directors’ incentives to maximize firm 
value, is assumed to decrease rent extraction to the detriment of shareholders. Haid and Yurtoglu 
(2006) demonstrated that the level of executive compensation is negatively associated with the 
number of shares owned by large shareholders. Academic research has not only been focused on the 
amount of compensation, but also in the sensitivity of this last to corporate performance. Mehran 
(1995) noted a negative association between CEO pay-sensitivity and the existence of significant 
block holders. As previously described, with respect to the kind of controlling shareholder, Italian 
firms represent a peculiar example. Lack of clarity is associated with familiar ownership: a larger 
commitment of family members in the management of the company can be reflected in a lower 
compensation with respect to non-family firms. Carrasco-Hernandez and Sanchez-Marin (2007) 
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pointed out that in family firms is more frequent for CEOs a lower total pay but a higher risk protection. 
This aspect is emphasized by the research of Combs et al. (2010), which propose, in line with 
stewardship theory, the role of CEO as steward that accepts to receive lower levels of compensation 
in exchange for job security. Croci et al. (2012) analysis, based on a sample from 14 European 
countries, empirically demonstrates that CEO total compensation is limited by the presence of 
controlling family shareholders. On the contrary, executive role can be considered as a tool to 
guarantee highly-remunerated positions to descendants of founder (Barontini and Bozzi, 2011), 
implying an opposite conclusion. Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) uncovered a positive association between 
management compensation and family ownership. Different hypotheses can be identified to stress the 
relationship between ownership concentration and executive compensation structure and 
sensitiveness:   
- Hypothesis 1: The larger the percentage of shares owned by the largest block holder, the lower 
is the total compensation of executives. 
- Hypothesis 2a: The presence of family ownership implies greater compensation of executives.  
- Hypothesis 2b: The presence of family ownership is associated with greater proportion of fixed 
compensation over the total one.  
Previous literature (Sykes, 2002; Jensen et al., 2004; Conyon and He, 2004) pointed out that the role 
of the board of directors as influent determinant of executive remuneration. The board represents 
indeed the first internal corporate governance mechanism with the responsibility to set and monitoring 
management compensation (Gomez-Meija et al., 1997), representing the shareholders and acting as a 
defence tool against opportunistic managers. In line with OECD Principles (2015), boards must be 
able to exercise objective and independent judgment, in order to fulfil their responsibilities. Bebchuck 
et al. (2002), noted that ineffective boards of directors, due to significant power of corporate insiders, 
are unable to exercise an independent judgment and encourage rent extraction. On the contrary, and 
in parallel, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989), empirically demonstrated that a greater control exercised 
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by the board of directors reduces the influence of CEO on the process of definition of its compensation. 
Enriques and Volpin (2007) pointed out that, in case of large block holder dominated firms, the 
existence of independent directors appointed by minority lists of shareholders increases the 
accountability of management and of the large shareholders it is appointed by. These directors do not 
enjoy any private benefit of control, are incentivised to operate independently (Bebchuck et al., 2010) 
and can consequently represent a significant monitoring tool over executive compensation (Sun and 
Cahan, 2009). To assess the effects of board monitoring on executive compensation, variables such 
as the size of the board or the share of independent directors, have commonly been used by academics. 
Relevance in this work is assumed by the number of independent directors, as well as the number of 
them appointed by minority lists of shareholders. These variables give rise to the following 
hypotheses:  
- Hypothesis 3a: The larger the number of independent members in the board of directors, the 
greater is the portion of incentive compensation tools over the total compensation.   
- Hypothesis 3b: The larger the number of independent members appointed by minority lists of 
shareholders in the board of directors, the greater is the portion of incentive compensation tools 
over the total compensation. 
Beyond the independence of the board, the presence of a remuneration (or compensation) committee 
can contribute in the reduction of executives’ power in the definition of their compensation schemes. 
This committee can conduct more efficiently its task if composed only by independent directors 
(Altomare and Zattoni, 2013). This point has been emphasized by the Italian Corporate Governance 
Committee, that in the revised Self-discipline Code (Art. VI) indicates as best corporate governance 
practice the introduction of a remuneration committee, composed for the most part by non-executive 
and independent directors. Lack of independence in the composition of remuneration committee 
implies, according to Bebchuk and Fried (2006) an increase of managerial power and the impossibility 
to safeguard the interests of shareholders in the negotiations of pay arrangements with executive 
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directors. It causes the possibility for executive directors to extract a rent (Bebchuck et al., 2002), 
intensifying the Agency Problem I. This issue has been mentioned by Melis et al. (2012) and Altomare 
and Zattoni (2013) as the risk that executive directors write their own remuneration contract with one 
hand and then sign it with the other one. With respect to studies that examine the relationship between 
executive compensation and the board of directors in its entirety, the role of subcommittees was 
addressed by a relative paucity of studies. Vafeas (2003) highlighted some evidence about a large 
presence of outside directors in compensation committee and a lower amount of fixed pay, compared 
to a more significant amount of contingent pay in CEO compensation schemes. Sun and Cahan (2009) 
demonstrated that CEO cash compensation is positively associated with accounting earnings in case 
of greater compensation committee quality. On the other hand, different studies were not able to point 
out a significant association between independence of compensation committee and compensation 
practices. Anderson and Bizjack (2003) were not able to find a statistically significant relationship 
between CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance and independence of remuneration 
committee. This lack of unambiguous evidence on the issue opens space to further research. With 
respect to compensation committee we expect that:  
- Hypothesis 4a: The larger the number of independent members in the remuneration committee, 
the greater is the portion of incentive compensation tools over the total compensation.   
- Hypothesis 4b: The larger the number of independent members appointed by minority lists of 
shareholders in the remuneration committee, the greater is the portion of incentive compensation 
tools over the total compensation. 
Hence, this research considers the relatives and the in-law relatives as a proxy for family members. 
Relating the independence of directors, the topic is ruled by two different Italian laws: 1. Codice di 
Autodisciplina (art. 3), a secondary standard adopted by listed firms (“Code”, and 2. Art. 148, 
paragraph 3 of the Consolidated Law on Finance (“TUF”). According to the Italian discipline, the 
definition of independent director is provided in a negative form. A director is not independent in case 
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i) he is related to other directors; ii) he is linked to the company or to the group by autonomous or 
subordinate employment relationships or by other relationships of a patrimonial or professional nature 
that compromise their independence. However, the declaration of independence status and the origin 
of appointment for the board (by a minority or majority shareholder) is disclosed on the annual 
corporate governance and ownership structure report. Thus, with the legislative intervention 
262/2005 “Disposizioni per la tutela del risparmio e la disciplina dei mercati finanzari”, 
Italian Parliament established that at least one member of the board of directors of listed 
companies is appointed by the most significant minority list of shareholders. It is possible 
that the shareholders' meeting votes according to the proportional model, so that the share 
of members of the board of directors is proportional to the voting rights expressed in the 
meeting or, alternatively, it is possible to reserve a predefined percentage of the members 
of the board of directors to minorities. Surely the level of representations of minority 
directors is correlated with the level of shareholding, but it is not possible for Italian 
system to identify a strict rule adopted by companies that establishes the number of 
minority directors according to well-defined parameters 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
One of the major reasons that explain the lack of empirical researches for top management 
compensation in Europe, and particularly in Italy, is the scarce availability of data about executive pay. 
A remuneration report for Italian listed companies is mandatory only starting from the year 2011. 
Before, data about executive compensation were disclosed in companies’ annual reports, without the 
current level of detail provided by individual documents and with “cryptic” information about stock 
options. The current research is based on 52 non-financial organizations listed on Italian Stock 
Exchange, considering data disclosed in 2011 and 2015, representing the 55.98 and 47.13 percent of 
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Italian Market capitalization. The first year is the one in which the recommendations of European 
Commission have been adopted in Italy, while the latter is the last available period in which companies 
published remuneration reports. Analysing the quality of information disclosed by firms in their 
remuneration reports, what appeared clear to the author is that it is indirectly related to size of the 
company. Consequently, a balanced sample composed of large firms has been adopted in the analysis. 
This sample, although small at a first impression, gave the author the possibility to gather data for 669 
executives and strategic directors over the two years considered in the research. Information about 
ownership structure and board composition was hand-collected using corporate governance reports 
of firms, while control variables data were collected on Bloomberg. As mentioned, this research is 
moved by the aim to analyse the effect of ownership, board of directors and remuneration committee 
on executive compensation. For executive chairman and vice-chairman, chief executive officer 
(CEO), executives and strategic directors, the dependent variable total compensation (COMP) was 
computed as the sum of fixed compensation, bonuses and other incentives, benefits, long terms 
incentive plans (corresponded and deferred in cash) and the fair value of stock grants and (phantom) 
stock options. Compensation granted by participated companies was not considered in the 
computation of total compensation. Considering that larger firms may be characterised by more 
executive directors in their boards or more strategic directors, the risk to consider a biased larger total 
compensation was solved calculating a sum of average compensation for each category of executives 
mentioned. As in Sakawa et al. (2012), different incentive ratios are defined as the percentage of total 
compensation represented by forms of incentive compensation. The denominator of computed ratio 
is always the total compensation while the numerator is variable. For IR_CASH the numerator is 
represented by cash incentive compensation, computed as sum of short and long-term cash bonuses. 
The variable IR_FV considers the fair value of stock grants and (phantom) stock options. IR_SHORT 
was considered as the ratio of short term bonuses and total compensation, while IR_LONG evaluates 
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the proportion of long term incentives (sum of long term incentive plans and fair value tools) over total 
compensation. 
 
 Table 1: Variables description 
Variable   Description 
Total compensation COMP* 
Total compensation obtained by company executives during the 
fiscal year. This is computed as the sum of fixed compensation, 
MBO, Benefits, LTIPs, FV of stock grants and (phantom) stock 
options 
Total incentive ratio IR_TOT 
Incentive ratio computed as the percentage of total compensation 
represented by incentive compensation.  Incentive compensation 
is computed as the sum of short (MBO) and long term (LTIP) 
cash bonuses, plus the fair value of stock grants and (phantom) 
stock options 
Short term incentive 
ratio IR_SHORT 
Incentive ratio computed as the percentage of total compensation 
represented by short term incentive compensation.  Short term 
incentive compensation is represented by MBO cash bonuses 
Long term incentive 
ratio IR_LONG 
Incentive ratio computed as the percentage of total compensation 
represented by long term incentive compensation. Long term 
incentive compensation is computed as the sum of long term 
(LTIP) cash bonuses, plus the fair value of stock grants and 
(phantom) stock options  
Cash form incentive 
ratio IR_CASH 
Incentive ratio computed as the percentage of total compensation 
represented by incentive compensation in cash.  Cash incentive 
compensation is represented by MBO and LTIP cash bonuses 
Equity form incentive 
ratio IR_FV 
Incentive ratio computed as the percentage of total compensation 
represented by incentive compensation in form of equity tools.  
Fair Value incentive compensation is computed as the sum of 
fair value of stock grants and (phantom) stock options 
Ownership ratio 
majority shareholder MAJ_OWN 
Ratio between the number of shares owned by first larger 
shareholders the total amount of issued shares 
Family firm MAJ_FAMILY Binary variable that equals one if the first majority shareholder is represented by a family and zero otherwise 
Independent directors 
on board BD_IND Number of independent directors on the board 
Minority directors on 
board BD_MIN 
Number of independent directors appointed to the board by 
minority lists of shareholders 
Independent directors 
of rem. committee RC_IND Number of independent directors on the remuneration committee 
Minority directors of 
rem. committee RC_MIN 
Number of independent directors, appointed by minority lists of 
shareholders to the remuneration committee 
Industry INDUSTRY Binary variable that equals one if company macro-sector is Utilities, Industrial or Oil and Gas; zero otherwise 
ROE ROE* Ratio between net income and shareholder equity 
Size SIZE* Total assets reported on firm balance sheet 
Market to book ratio MTB* Ratio between market and book value of equity 
This table provides a description of variables adopted in the analysis. Variables marked with * are log transformed in 
regressions for scale purposes. 
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With respect to explanatory variables, MAJ_OWN represent the number of shares owned by the first 
larger shareholder, divided by the total amount of issued shares, while the binary variable 
MAJ_FAMILY classifies companies as family firms or not.  BD_IND and BD_MIN represent the number 
of independent and minority directors in the board; RC_IND and RC_MIN were built with the same logic 
considering the remuneration committee composition. The variables ROE (measured as ratio between 
net income and total shareholder equity), SIZE (measured as the logarithm of total assets), and MTB 
(measured as logarithm of market-to-book ratio and proxy for growth opportunities) were entered in 
the models as control variables. Following the method adopted by Melis et al. (2012), a dummy 
variable (INDUSTRY) was introduced to consider whether the companies analyzed can be classified as 
industrial or not. A detailed description of variables is provided in Table 1A in the appendix. Based 
on the variables identified, a generic theoretical equation has been structured as follow: 
 
						𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 	𝛽0 +	.𝛽i 	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑣𝑎𝑟i 0123 	+	.𝛽j 	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙	𝑣𝑎𝑟j 7823 + 	𝜀 
 
Following the methodology adopted by Lopes and Ferraz (2016), a set of tests was performed to 
ensure the eligibility of the sample for its application in multiple regressions (Cohen et al., 2013). The 
statistical programs R© and SPSS© have been adopted for the development of the models. To 
understand whether the distribution of the errors presents a variance that remains similar when moving 
along the line of residuals, a test for homoscedasticity was performed through “Non-constant Variance 
Score Test” function in R©. What emerged by this test, is that none of the regressions present the 
problem of heteroscedasticity, but those related to the dependent variable IR_LONG. The variable has 
consequently been excluded by the development of the models. To verify lack of multicollinearity 
among independent variables, the variance inflation factors were observed. Since moderate correlation 
(VIF close to 5) was detected in case variable RC_SIZE (computed as the total number of directors in 
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the remuneration committee) was considered in the models, the decision was to exclude this regressor 
by the analysis, to focus the attention on independent and minority directors of the committee. 
Additionally, following the model of Melis et al. (2012), the correlation between the number of 
independent directors appointed by minority lists of shareholders and the presence of at least one in 
the remuneration committee led the author to study with different models the impact of board of 
directors and compensation committee on executive compensation. Lack of heteroscedasticity and 
absence of multicollinearity allowed the author not to eliminate observations from the sample, 
considering all selected 52 companies in the empirical models.  
3.2 Descriptive and correlation measures 
According to the classification provided by Borsa Italiana report, companies adopted as sample for 
this study operates in 7 macro sectors.  Industials macro-sector represents the 32.69% of the total 
sample, followed by Consumer Goods and Utilities, which respectively accounts for the 21.15% and 
the 17.3% of the sample. A medium weight is assumed by Consumer Services companies, that 
represent the 13.46% of the sample. A smaller relevance is assumed by companies operating in Oil 
and Gas, Health care and Telecommunications macro-sectors, representing in order the 7.69%, the 
5.77% and the 1.92% of the total sample.  
 
Regarding ownership structure, the situation appears quite stable between 2011 and 2015: the 
presence of large block holders is testified by an average 50% of shares directly or indirectly 
attributable to a single larger shareholder. Of the sample analyzed, more than 60% of companies are 
family firms. The same stability is present when board composition is considered: on average, board 
of directors for Italian companies selected in the sample is composed by 11 members (on average 
11.42 and 11.13 respectively in 2011 and 2015). Independent directors represent on average half of 
the board, showing a little increase over time (46% in 2011 and 52% in 2015). Number of minority 
independent directors showed an increase (21.43%) during the period. Concerning the remuneration 
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committee, it was instituted by 46 companies in 2011 (94% of the sample) and added to its corporate 
governance structure by only one company in 2015 (47 companies, 96% of the sample). This large 
adoption, in line with Self-Discipline Code, drove the author to exclude the presence of remuneration 
committee as independent variable in the models. In line with corporate governance best practices, 
remuneration committee results composed for the majority by independent directors (79% in 2011 
and 82% in 2015), while only a little proportion is represented by minority directors (13% in 2011 and 
14% in 2015). Considering executive compensation, the average salary was 2.9 € million in 2011 and 
increased up to 3.06 € million in 2015 (4.76% increase). The largest part of salary is represented by 
fixed compensation, which accounts on average for the 66% of total compensation. This preliminary 
observation seems far from normative prescriptions, with a disequilibrium between fixed and variable 
components of compensation: other incentive ratios have been computed and most relevant insights 
regard the kind of incentive compensation adopted are reported. For Italian companies, it seems more 
frequent an adoption of incentive plans in cash (24% of total compensation on average in both periods) 
with respect to equity tools (10% and 11% of total compensation on average in 2011 and 2015). 
Following the definition of short and long-term incentive ratios proposed in paragraph 3.1, it seems 
that Italian companies analyzed adopted a certain balance in the proportion of long and short-term 
forms of compensation, with a slight preference for long term tools in 2011 and the reverse condition 
in 2015. In order to have a preliminary evidence about correlation between variables, Pearson 
correlation coefficients have been computed for the model that will be analysed hereafter.  
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Table 2: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for dependent and independent variables in the pooled sample. P-
values are reported in parentheses and symbols indicate a 1%** and 5%* level of statistical significance (2-tailed). 
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What emerges by these preliminary results is that the total compensation of executives is positively 
correlated with firm size and, with a lower statistical significance, negatively correlated with 
concentration of ownership, confirming expected signals. A positive correlation is present between 
the total compensation and number of independent directors. It seems to be at odds with expectations. 
Lack of correlation is observable between total compensation of executives and other independent 
variables. Concerning the total incentive ratio, coefficients show a positive correlation with both 
market-to-book ratio and firm size. It seems that firms with larger growth perspectives and larger 
amount of invested capital are more prone to adopt heavily incentive forms of compensation. The 
presence of large block-holders, in line Mehran (1995) research, seems negatively correlated, with a 
weaker statistical significance, with total incentive ratio. With respect to board composition, a larger 
number of independent and minority directors is positively correlated with the incentive ratio. This 
first result seems in line with formulated hypotheses. No evidence is present with respect to a possible 
correlation between compensation committee variables and incentive ratio. A deeper analysis will be 
conducted, to confirm or deny these preliminary results. 
 
3.3 The regression models 
To understand the different impact of variables over time, both on total compensation and pay mix, 
three different models have been structured. Dependent variables are related to ownership, board of 
directors and remuneration committee variables respectively. The composition of the dataset, made 
up of two cross sections that refer to the same companies over the two periods considered, did not 
provide the author the possibility to implement panel data with fixed effects. Since the observed 
companies are the same over time, a pooled OLS would result biased by idiosyncratic features of 
companies, duplicated in the sample. In order to test the different effects of corporate governance 
variables in the two years, single regressions for each year were modeled and a Z-test on the difference 
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of coefficients performed. Following the methodology of Paternoster (1998) and Cohen et al. (2013), 
a Z-statistic has been computed, for the ith variable as:  																																																					𝑍1 = 	 ;<,>?@AB	;<,>?@@CDE<,>?@A> F	DE<,>?@@>                                                 
Results of linear regressions are provided in the following tables. 
Table 3: Influence of ownership on executive compensation 
 [1]  [2]  
  COMP Z value IR_TOT Z value 
MAJ_OWN -1.414* -0.452 (-1.012) -0.359* -0.134 (-0.805) 
 [0.731] [0.609]  [0.212] [0.183]  
MAJ_FAMILY 0.7** 0.713*** (-0.035) 0.128 0.112 (0.148) 
 [0.273] [0.254]  [0.079] [0.076]  
INDUSTRY -0.531** -0.221 (-0.947) -0.047 0.016 (-0.651) 
 [0.211] [0.25]  [0.061] [0.075]  
ROE -0.505 0.33 (-0.735) 0.192 0.173 (0.056) 
 [0.855] [0.747]  [0.248] [0.224]  
SIZE 0.391*** 0.394*** (-0.02) 0.082*** 0.08*** (0.05) 
 [0.078] [0.083]  [0.023] [0.025]  
MTB 0.695* 0.239 (1.028) 0.274*** 0.127 (1.128) 
 [0.349] [0.273]  [0.101] [0.082]  
Constant 6.074*** 5.561*** (0.182) -1.554*** -1.585** (0.037) 
 [1.919] [2.062]  [0.556] [0.619]         
Year 2011 2015   2011 2015   
Pseudo R2 0.487 0.427  0.376 0.300  
Observations  52 52   52 52   
This table reports the results of linear regressions. For each model [n], column 1 and 2 report the results of linear 
regressions based on cross sections referring to 2011 and 2015 respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
For each model [n], column 3 reports the results of a two-tailed Z test (Ho:	β1,KL3M = 	β1,KL33), adopted to test the 
differences of coefficients over time. The symbols indicate a 1%***, 5%** and 10%* level of statistical significance. 
 
What emerges by the models is that ownership variables present different impacts with respect to 
compensation variables. The first hypothesis seems to be confirmed in year 2011 with a moderate 
significance level. In line with the theories of Barontini and Bozzi (2011), the more the ownership is 
concentrated and the lower is the level of executive compensation. By model 2, again for year 2011 it 
is possible to infer, with weak statistical significance, that a larger percentage of shares owned by the 
largest block holder implies a negative variation of incentive ratio and hence a compensation of 
executives that is less sensitive to firm performance with respect to firms with less concentrated 
ownership. Although coefficients are in line with those of the regression model for 2011, the same 
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evidences are not supported by statistical significance for the year 2015. This is a first indicator of 
variation between models over time. With respect to hypothesis 2a, what emerges by the regressions 
is that, in both periods, with a strong statistical significance, family firms tend to pay their executives 
more with respect to non-family companies, supporting the conclusions of Haid and Yurtoglu 
research (2006).  Concerning hypothesis 2b, model 2 points out for both years positive coefficients, 
implying in family firms a greater proportion of incentive compensation tools over the total 
compensation. This evidence is however not supported by statistical significance. 
 
Table 4: Influence of board of directors on executive compensation 
 [3]  [4]  
  COMP Z value IR_TOT Z value 
BD_IND 0.288 0.383 (-0.216) 0.177* 0.039 (1.089) 
 [0.328] [0.298]  [0.088] [0.091]  
BD_MIN -0.129 -0.604** (1.575) 0.012 0.009 (0.034) 
 [0.201] [0.225]  [0.054] [0.068]  
INDUSTRY -0.641*** -0.355 (-0.884) -0.069 -0.025 (-0.475) 
 [0.22] [0.238]  [0.059] [0.072]  
ROE -0.385 0.599 (-0.89) 0.204 0.287 (-0.262) 
 [0.837] [0.723]  [0.226] [0.221]  
SIZE 0.38*** 0.447*** (-0.526) 0.066*** 0.072** (-0.15) 
 [0.089] [0.09]  [0.024] [0.028]  
MTB 0.792** 0.359 (0.927) 0.326*** 0.118 (1.578) 
 [0.374] [0.279]  [0.101] [0.085]  
Constant 5.601*** 4.237** (0.497) -1.653*** -1.445** (-0.263) 
 [1.941] [1.939]  [0.523] [0.591]         
Year 2011 2015   2011 2015   
Pseudo R2 0.416 0.421  0.324 0.264  
Observations  52 52   52 52   
This table reports the results of linear regressions. For each model [n], column 1 and 2 report the results of linear 
regressions based on cross sections referring to 2011 and 2015 respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
For each model [n], column 3 reports the results of a two-tailed Z test (Ho:	β1,KL3M = 	β1,KL33), adopted to test the 
differences of coefficients over time. The symbols indicate a 1%***, 5%** and 10%* level of statistical significance. 
 
With respect to board of directors, few evidences can be pointed out with respect to formulated 
hypotheses. The hypothesis 3b seems confirmed, with weak statistical significance, by the model 4 
for year 2011: ceteris paribus, the larger the number of independent members of the board, the greater 
was the proportion of compensation represented by incentive tools, testifying the role of independent 
directors as shareholders delegated with a strong influence over executive remuneration (Sykes, 2002; 
Jensen et al., 2004; Conyon and He, 2004). Their effect seems however mitigated over time. What 
 20 
emerges by model 3 is that in 2015, the number of minority directors assumed relevance (with 
moderate statistical significance) in explaining lower managers’ compensation. Model 4 does not 
point out any evidence concerning the relation between the number of minority directors and the 
incentive ratio: the coefficients are in both years in line with the hypothesis 3c but there is no statistical 
evidence to support this relation.  
 
Table 5: Influence of remuneration committee on executive compensation 
 [5]  [6]  
  COMP Z value IR_TOT Z value 
RC_IND 0.4 0.552* (-0.37) 0.067 0.092 (-0.215) 
 [0.299] [0.282]  [0.086] [0.084]  
RC_MIN -0.692** -0.959*** (0.584) -0.128 -0.206** (0.586) 
 [0.332] [0.313]  [0.096] [0.093]  
INDUSTRY -0.478** -0.232 (-0.747) -0.036 0.028 (-0.667) 
 [0.227] [0.24]  [0.065] [0.072]  
ROE -0.16 0.689 (-0.797) 0.205 0.196 (0.029) 
 [0.806] [0.696]  [0.232] [0.208]  
SIZE 0.493*** 0.449*** (0.357) 0.104*** 0.099*** (0.149) 
 [0.093] [0.08]  [0.027] [0.024]  
MTB 0.827** 0.382 (1.001) 0.31*** 0.164** (1.131) 
 [0.353] [0.27]  [0.102] [0.081]  
Constant 3.121 4.007** (-0.31) -2.228*** -2.093*** (-0.161) 
 [2.2] [1.828]  [0.634] [0.546]         
Year 2011 2015   2011 2015   
Pseudo R2 0.460 0.452  0.350 0.338  
Observations  52 52   52 52   
This table reports the results of linear regressions. For each model [n], column 1 and 2 report the results of linear 
regressions based on cross sections referring to 2011 and 2015 respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
For each model [n], column 3 reports the results of a two-tailed Z test (Ho:	β1,KL3M = 	β1,KL33), adopted to test the 
differences of coefficients over time. The symbols indicate a 1%***, 5%** and 10%* level of statistical significance. 
 
 
Recalling the analysis of previous paragraphs, remuneration committee variables adopted in the 
models 5 and 6 are those related to the number of independent and minority directors. Due to 
multicollinearity problems, the variable RC_SIZE was excluded, while it did not seem worthy to 
consider a binary variable indicating the presence or the absence or remuneration committee, since 
most of firms (94% in 2011 and 96% in 2015) adopted a remuneration committee, respecting 
European Committee recommendations. In line with the evolution of normative framework is also 
the relationship of compensation variables with the ones of compensation committee. Both in 2011 
and 2015, evidences point out, with strong statistical significance, that a larger number of minority 
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directors is, ceteris paribus, associated with lower levels of executive compensation. This is an 
important result, considering the role of minority directors as advocates of minority shareholders in 
mitigating agency problems. In terms of coefficients, an opposite evidence emerges for the number of 
independent directors, although only for 2015 a weak statistical significance is reported. With respect 
to hypotheses 4a, it seems that neither in 2011 nor in 2015 the number of independent directors had a 
significant impact on the incentive ratio. Model 6 provides an interesting evidence: for the year 2015, 
the number of independent directors appointed by minority lists of shareholders has a statistically 
significant effect on the ratio between contingency pay and total compensation. However, hypothesis 
4b is turned down due to the sign of the coefficient, providing results that are divergent with European 
recommendations of equilibrium between fixed and variable compensation.  
For each model, results of the two-sided Z-test (𝐻𝑜:	𝛽1,3M = 	𝛽1,33)	point out that the null hypothesis 
can never be rejected, implying that factors did not present different coefficients in terms of magnitude 
over time. 
 
3.4 Other attempts 
A wider set of models was built to consider possible decompositions of the incentive ratio and valuate 
with a greater detail the variables that had an impact on the composition of executive pay mix. 
However, different reasons drove the author not to consider the models in the work: for the dependent 
variable IR_LONG heteroscedasticity problems emerged, while for other incentive ratios two different 
issues incurred: some regressions were not significant, while, for those that were significant, 
independent variables did not affect with statistical significance the dependent variables, preventing 
the author to provide additional contributions to the literature.  
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
This work provides a contribution to the still limited literature about executive remuneration in non-
Anglo-Saxon countries, providing evidences for large Italian listed companies, that are characterized 
by peculiar features in terms of corporate governance. In addition, it contributes to the knowledge 
about the impact that European Union and national recommendations had for Italian firms since the 
beginning of the current decade.  
Evidences show that ownership nature is a determinant feature in the Italian context to explain 
executive compensation: family firms tend to pay their executives more than non-family companies 
but scarce evidence is pointed out in terms of definition of executive pay mix. The role of board of 
directors as determinant of executive compensation, documented in previous studies, seems to lose its 
significance with the introduction of a remuneration committee. What emerges by the analysis is 
indeed that minority directors in the remuneration committee are significant determinant of executive 
compensation. Nevertheless, results are not in line with the Self-Discipline Code: although a larger 
presence of minority directors in the remuneration committee is related to lower compensation 
corresponded to executives, the equilibrium between the fixed and variable compensation, aimed by 
recommendations, seems not guaranteed by their presence. Rather, a larger proportion of minority 
directors seems to be associated with a lower weight of variable components of compensation with 
respect to the fixed one. This finding, along with the stability of compensation pay mix over time, may 
have important policy-making implications, given the interest of shareholders and regulator: codes of 
best practices should consequently foster the compliance to European recommendations.  
However, these evidences are the result of a methodology characterised by a series of limitations. The 
first restriction is related to the sample selection: as emphasized in the work, only data about large 
companies were considered in the dataset. This is explainable by the fact that remuneration reports 
quality is indirectly related to the size of the firms. The second limitation is attributable to the time 
frame considered: if on one side it can be justifiable to study the effect of a policy at the moment of 
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the introduction and in the last observable period, on the other, the selection of a 2-year cross section 
of data prevented the author to adopt different statistical tools, such as panel data. In line with these 
limitations, possible suggestions for further research could be arguable. A possibility would be 
considering the evolution of compensation schemes of executives in a larger time horizon, not only 
relying on a single country, but rather expanding the analysis to cover the whole panel of European 
companies interested by the recommendations, increasing in this way not only the sample size, but 
also considering the reception of the recommendations by smaller firms. Additionally, a comparison 
between countries that adopted binding laws and those that relied on codes of best practices to apply 
European recommendations can be performed, with the aim to test the effectiveness of the two 
different approaches. Concerning the independent variables adopted in the model, possible studies 
may be driven by the aim to extend the analysis to different ownership structures, considering not only 
the first majority shareholder, but also other significant owners and their nature. An interesting 
measure of ownership could also be represented by the percentage of shares owned by executive 
directors. This measure represents a proxy for executives’ power, that could have a direct influence on 
remuneration committee conduct and consequently an indirect effect on compensation tools adopted 
within companies. With respect to specific characteristics of variables, important implications for 
executive compensation could be identified considering qualitative features in the analysis: socio-
demographic characteristics, gender, academic and professional background of remuneration 
committee members could have significance in explaining the compensation policies adopted by 
companies.  
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